Equitable But Ineffective: How The Principle Of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles The Global Fight Against Climate Change by Bortscheller, Mary J.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 10
Issue 2 Winter 2010: Climate Law Reporter 2010 Article 15
Equitable But Ineffective: How The Principle Of
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
Hobbles The Global Fight Against Climate Change
Mary J. Bortscheller
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bortscheller, Mary J. “Equitable But Ineffective: How The Principle Of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles The
Global Fight Against Climate Change.” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Spring 2010, 49-53, 65-68.
49 SuStainable Development law & policy
eQuitable but ineffective: how the 
pRinciple of common but DiffeRentiateD 
ReSponSibilitieS hobbleS the global fight 
againSt climate change
by Mary J. Bortscheller*
* Mary J. Bortscheller is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University 
Washington College of Law. 
InTroducTIon


































This	 article	 examines	China’s	 unique	 situation	within	 the	












whose	participation	 in	 the	climate	 regime	 impacts	other	major	










common buT dIFFerenTIaTed responsIbIlITIes
In	 recognition	 of	 the	 daunting	 environmental	 problems	 it	
faces,	China	is	shifting	toward	increased	domestic	environmental	
responsibility,	making	resource	conservation	and	environmental-









and	 developing	 countries	 had	 concerns	 about	 who	 would	 be	
the	first	to	reduce	GHG	emissions,	and	who	would	finance	the	






form	of	elevated	standards	of	 living.20	Thus,	 in	order	 to	reach	
























Based	 upon	 the	 two	 central	 considerations	 of	 CDR,	 the	
























UNFCCC	or	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 that	 elaborate	on	 the	process	
of	categorizing	member	nations.35	This	makes	the	international	
































One	 of	 China’s	 chief	 strategies	 for	 addressing	 global	 cli-
mate	change	is	to	“uphold”	the	principle	of	CDR,	which	currently	
allows	China	 to	avoid	emissions	 reduction	commitments.44	 In	
support	of	its	position,	China	advances	several	arguments,	noting	
the	nation’s	relative	poverty,	its	relatively	low	per	capita	emis-































































the pRinciple of cDR in application iS politically 
ineffective
Notwithstanding	 the	 soundness	 of	 CDR,	 the	 principle	 is	
problematic	 because	 it	 has	 created	 a	 paradigm	 that,	 if	 it	 per-
sists,	will	not	allow	the	nations	of	the	world	to	effectively	com-
bat	global	warming.64	The	current	interpretation	of	CDR	in	the	











For	 example,	 the	 regime	 does	 not	 sufficiently	 distinguish	
between	developing	countries	like	China	and	Botswana.67	The	
closest	 it	 comes	 to	distinguishing	between	developing	country	
parties	 is	 to	 emphasize	 the	 need	 to	 help	 developing	 countries	
that	are	“particularly	vulnerable”	to	the	adverse	impacts	of	cli-
mate	change.68	Accordingly,	China	frames	its	policy	statements	
on	climate	change	 to	fit	 this	 characterization;	 indeed,	 a	 recent	
government	White	Paper	echoes	the	UNFCCC’s	provision	dis-















the pRinciple of cDR in application iS pRactically 
ineffective
Any	climate	change	agreement	that	excludes	China	and	other	
















developing	countries	 to	avoid	reduction	targets	will	 result	 in	a	
considerable	amount	of	GHG	emissions	left	unregulated.78



















no caTegory currenTly exIsTs To properly 


















































The unFccc needs a neW caTegory oF 
emITTer To ensure greaTer parTIcIpaTIon
Although	member	countries	must	agree	to	be	bound	by	the	












ments	upon	parties	and	sufficient	 incentives	 to	draw	parties	 to	
voluntarily	commit,	the	UNFCCC	has	very	few	legal	tools	at	its	
disposal	to	obtain	increased	commitments	out	of	unwilling	parties.
the inteRnational community muSt uSe a vaRiety 












ciently	 solve	an	 international	problem	 that	domestically	poses	









in	public	health	while	also	contributing	 to	 the	global	 effort	 to	
53 SuStainable Development law & policy
fight	climate	change.107	Second,	greater	participation	in	the	post-
Kyoto	 regime	 would	 provide	 a	 corresponding	 opportunity	 for	








reputation	as	 an	 international	 leader	 and	 indicate	 to	 the	world	
that	China	envisions	a	leadership	role	that	involves	greater	global	
responsibility.110




























successor	 to	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 so	 long	as	 it	 can	expect	both	
global	and	domestic	net	benefits.119




















































65 SuStainable Development law & policy



























































Matthew	Nicely	&	Valerie	Ellis,	The Potential Clash of Climate Change Policy 





































4	 See	Juliet	Eilperin,	Developing Nations Plan Emission Cuts,	waSh. poSt,	
Dec.	12,	2008,	at	A10	[hereinafter	Eilperin,	Developing Nations]	(reporting	that	
getting	emerging	economies	like	China	to	limit	their	GHG	emissions	is	con-
sidered	crucial	to	the	success	of	a	global	climate	regime);	see also	pew centeR 
on global climate change anD the aSia Society, common challenge, col-
laboRative ReSponSe: a RoaDmap foR u.S.-china coopeRation on eneRgy anD 
climate change	18	(Jan.	2009)	[hereinafter	pew centeR RepoRt]	(emphasizing	
that	China,	along	with	the	United	States,	must	actively	work	to	reduce	GHG	
emissions	in	order	to	solve	the	global	climate	change	problem).















inafter	UNFCCC];	see,	e.g.,	Jonathan	B.	Wiener,	Climate Change Policy and 
Policy Change in China,	55	u.c.l.a. l. Rev.	1805,	1807	(2008)	(emphasizing	
endnoTes: eQuitable but ineffective: how the pRinciple of common but DiffeRentiateD ReSponSibilitieS 











10	 See, e.g.,	Pamela	Constable,	The Anti-Junket is Coming to Town: As World 
Leaders Converge on D.C., Nothing But Business on the Agenda,	waSh. poSt,	
Nov.	15,	2008,	at	A10	(noting	China’s	recent	participation	in	the	G20	Summit);	




11	 E.g.,	Kenneth	Lieberthal	and	David	Sandalow,	china centeR at bRookingS, 








reduce	global	GHG	emissions);	see also	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	The World vs. the 
United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Lead-
ing Greenhouse Gas Emitters,	55	u.c.l.a. l. Rev.	1675,	1676	(2008)	[herein-


























19	 See	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,	38	





20	 See	Daniel	Barstow	Magraw,	The Worst of Times, or “It Wouldn’t Be Cool,”	







22	 See	centRe foR int’l SuStainable Dev. l., the pRinciple of common but 





24	 See	Sunstein,	Of Montreal and Kyoto,	supra	note	19,	at	10566,	10568	
(deeming	the	negotiating	model	established	by	the	Montreal	Protocol	extraordi-
narily	successful	at	reversing	ozone	depletion).











28	 E.g., id. at	Annex	I	and	Annex	II	(distinguishing	between	developed	coun-
tries	that	have	completed	a	transition	to	a	market	economy	and	those	developed	
countries	that	have	not).




















34	 See id. arts.	4.2(g),	19.













countries	listed	in	Annex	I	shall	limit	their	GHG	emissions);	see also id. art.	
10	(stating	all	Parties	reaffirm	existing	commitments	“in	pursuit	of	the	ultimate	
objective	of	the	[Framework]	Convention”).





41	 See	china State council info. office, white papeR: china’S policieS anD 









44	 See	white	papeR: climate change,	supra	note	41,	at	§	III.










47	 See	The Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games On Human Rights and the Rule 










49	 See, e.g.,	Sheryl	Gay	Stolberg,	As Leaders Wrestle With Downturn, Develop-








play	at	recess);	see also	Elizabeth	C.	Economy,	The Great Leap Backward? 















54	 See	Andrew	Jacobs,	U.N. Report Points to Peril from Noxious ‘Brown 
Clouds,’	n.y. timeS	Nov.	13,	2008,	at	A6	(calling	the	resulting	air	a	toxic	mix	
that	can	cause	cardiovascular	and	respiratory	disease).




increased	fines);	see also	Steven	M.	Dickinson,	Energy Efficiency Law Devoid 
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60	 See, e.g., id. at	290-91	(likening	instruments	that	adhere	to	CDR	to	rescue	
vehicles	for	developing	countries).















































73	 See	Wiener,	supra	note	7,	at	1809;	see also	Sunstein,	The World vs. the 
























80	 Cf.	Sunstein,	The World vs. the United States and China?,	supra	note	26,	at	
1686	(predicting	that	the	highest	GHG	emitters	of	the	past	may	not	be	the	high	
emitters	of	the	future).
81	 Cf.	pew centeR RepoRt,	supra	note	51,	at	18	(reporting	that	the	United	States	
is	the	largest	contributor	to	historic	GHG	stocks	in	the	atmosphere,	accounting	
for	twenty-nine	percent	of	emissions	since	1850).










86	 See id. art	2.3;	see also	UNFCCC,	supra	note	7,	art.	4.8.
87	 Compare	white papeR: climate change,	supra	note	41,	at	Foreword	(assert-
ing	that	China	has	a	fragile	eco-environment	and	is	vulnerable	to	adverse	









ing	Countries,	List of Least Developed Countries,	http://www.unohrlls.org/
en/ldc/related/62/	(last	visited	Mar.	19,	2010)	(defining	forty-nine	countries	as	
“least	developed;”	China	is	not	included	on	the	list).
90	 See	Elisabeth	Rosenthal,	Booming China Leads the World in Emissions of 
Carbon Dioxide, a Study Finds,	n.y. timeS,	June	14,	2008,	at	A5	(quoting	a	
European	report	finding	that	China’s	2007	emissions	were	fourteen	percent	
higher	than	the	United	States’	emissions).
91	 See	Elisabeth	Rosenthal	and	Andrew	C.	Revkin,	Science Panel Says Global 













95	 See id. at	34	(describing	the	difficulties	Chinese	leaders	face	in	balancing	the	
competing	priorities	of	the	developed	and	the	developing	areas	of	the	country).
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